The political background

The dawn of the German and French states contains one figure that both countries claim as their own: Charles the Great - also known as Charlemagne. By birth, he belonged to the Franks and so was a German by descent, but, as the conqueror of the Gallic lands, he ensured the continuity of the Gallic-Roman civilization there, an achievement reflected in his Latin title of Carolus Magnus. In fact, rather than being either German or French, he could rather be regarded as the last Roman and the first European, the creator of an occidental unity.

His empire stretched from the Pyrenees across the Rhine, north to the River Elbe and east to the River Saale, from the North Sea to the center of Italy. However, after his death, the unity Charlemagne had created was lost. Under his sons, the empire disintegrated - the West Franks became the French and the East Franks became the Germans.

The first time the difference between the French and the Germans became apparent was in Strasbourg - a city later much-disputed by France and Germany - and it was a difference which was revealed by language. Charlemagne's grandchildren were engaged in a civil war (but not an international war), and in 842, in what became known as 'The Strasbourg Oath', two brothers swore allegiance against the third. The oath was sworn in Old French by Charles the Bald and in Old High German by Ludwig the German. One year later, the Treaty of Verdun saw the dissolution of the Carolingian Empire: Charles received the kingdom of the West Franks while Ludwig received the lands of the East Franks and the elder brother, Lothar, was given the title of Emperor and the lands of the middle empire from Friesland on the North Sea coast to Provence in the south, and from Aachen to Rome. This 'Lotharingian' realm north of the Alps - and with it, the Rhine - became a contested area, and long the subject of a struggle between the Germans and the French.

France and Germany - the latter as a geographical unit rather than as a state - developed in quite different ways. Supremacy in Europe passed initially to the German Kings and Emperors. But this supremacy became eroded as the Emperors soon became entangled in political conflict and religious strife with the Papacy. Forced to rely on the nobles of the land, they found themselves paying dearly for loyalty and allegiance, locked into a process of constantly increasing the nobles' rights and independence. The Golden Bull in 1356 marked the end of this process - from then on, the Emperor himself was elected by the seven electoral princes. The idea of an imperial monarchy had received a serious blow; afterwards, the Emperor was only as powerful as his own dynastic power could make him. But while a map of Germany at this time reveals a colorful patchwork of different states and principalities, the French Kings were better able to shape their country into a single unified state. They centered themselves on the Ile de France, consolidated the royal lands, removed the individual rule of nobles from the feudal system, centralized the administration and formed the outlines of a national state.

Over the centuries, France as a strong centralized state knew very well how to make use of the weaknesses of the German Empire. The southern, western and northern borders of France are natural, formed by coasts and mountains, but to the east, France seemed vulnerable, and for this reason - under the most varied rulers and political systems - it tried to take the Rhine as the fourth 'natural' border. Its struggle against the hegemony of the Spanish Hapsburg monarchy, surrounding it on all sides, was certainly one main motive underlying its attempts to take the Rhine. In part, the French were successful, though their success also came from the disintegration of their eastern neighbor.

But how did the historical enmity between the Germans and the French arise? Historians agree to a large extent that this 'arch enmity' is a rather modern phenomenon, occurring first in the 19th century. An initial tendency towards such an enmity emerges on the German side as a consequence of foreign rule under Napoleon and in the wake of the ensuing War of Liberation. This enmity was directed at combating the infiltration of a foreign culture, and it was during this struggle against Napoleon that a hatred of the French developed.

It is generally agreed that the actual start of this arch enmity can be dated exactly with the victory of the Prussian army over the Austrians at Sadowa (Königgratz) and the formation afterwards of the Prussian-dominated North German Confederation in 1866. The French, at the time under Napoleon III, considered themselves deceived, affronted, and threatened by their Prussian neighbor, and cries of 'Revenge for Sadowa' rang through the streets. In 1870, Napoleon III did Bismarck the favor of declaring war against Prussia, uniting the Germans in an upsurge of anti-French nationalistic fervor. Prussia swiftly won the war and, carried along on a wave of nationalist sentiment, chose the mirrored hall at Versailles as a suitable location to proclaim the founding of the German Empire under Prussian leadership. Bismarck, in the course of this Empire building, annexed Alsace and Lorraine, using this new 'Reichsland' as a common cause to bond the new unity together.

It was a plan that worked: The war booty of Alsace-Lorraine made enmity towards France an integral element of the new German Empire's existence. Although there was a request for a referendum on nationality, the Germans refused to allow their new 'Reichsland' to hold one. The more contemporary history of France and Germany is likely to be familiar too. They were involved in two more wars - this time, world wars - with Germany appearing to be on the side of the losers and France on that of the winners (though looking back, all three wars and their casualties were all senseless and, in that way, there were only losers.) Between1918 and 1945, Alsace-Lorraine became French once more: within 75 years, it had been French three times and German twice.

German-French rapprochement on the Rhine

What effect did the catastrophic development of relations between the two countries in the 19th century have on the Rhine?

The Grand Canale d'Alsace

In reality, the Versailles Peace Treaty, signed in 1919, was not an agreement, but dictated the terms of peace to a defeated nation, making Imperial Germany liable for harsh reparations which - as later became clear - it could never completely pay. However, the harshness of the reparations gave further sustenance to the German side of this 'arch enmity' and became a tool used by the National Socialists in their rise to power. As for the Rhine, France secured the right in Art. 358 "to extract water from the Rhine to feed the existing shipping canals or those yet to be built or for any other purpose." Further, France received the exclusive right to regulate river flow. On the basis of this agreement, France planned - and began - a major piece of construction work that was to have an exceptionally grave effect on the German side of the Rhine: the Grand Canale d'Alsace, a 120-kilometre-long concrete-lined canal on the Alsatian (i.e., French) side, stretching from Kembs to Strasbourg and designed to re-route almost the entire water volume from the bed of the Rhine.

The cross-section of the French branch canal had a water depth of 12 meters, a canal base of 80 meters across and a water level width of 150 meters - dimensions larger than either the Suez or the Panama Canal. From 1928 to 1959, of the planned eight retaining stages (weir, power station, sluice) only four were built. The withdrawal of up to 1400 m³/s from the surge of the Rhine left only 10 to 50 m³/s in the original river bed and led to considerable drawbacks and damage, in particular for downstream residents along the river bank opposite the branch canal, primarily:

Canal loop solution

In view of the consequences following the completion (e.g., destruction of vegetation and the start of degeneration into wasteland), Germany and France agreed on the need for initial negotiations - proving that the first signs of a spirit of neighborliness were present which would make such an agreement possible. Aware that carrying through this canal construction would have serious consequences, particularly for the German side, the two states, as early as 1955, founded a study commission to present alternative suggestions to the canal construction.

The results of this study commission formed the basis of the Franco-German Treaty on the Extension of the Upper Rhine between Basle and Strasbourg (1956). In this agreement, France relinquished its plans to construct a through branch canal beyond Breisach, and both parties agreed on further actions on the Rhine in what was called the "Loop Solution," envisaging construction of four dams at Marckolsheim, Rheinau, Gerstheim and Strasburg from 1960 to 1970.

Each dam was so designed that the Rhine remained in its existing river bed and would only be diverted on the French side via a power station and shipping canal near the dam itself. The 1956 agreement gave a written form to these dams, which made concessions to German interests. In the first place, they took into account environmental concerns, since they took steps to deal with the damaging effects of falling ground water levels. Moreover, the measures gave Rhine shipping direct access to the German river-bank, especially beneficial to the development of industrial locations there. France, in turn, had no disadvantages in terms of energy supply in committing itself to the altered construction plans.

Dams in the river bed

Another step in promoting good neighborly relations had to be taken soon. It had become clear, shortly after full implementation, that constructing the branch canal dams under the loop solution had resulted in considerable river bed erosion. The erosion was a result of the lack of deposit from the upper reaches. If no action were taken, this erosion would have led to a continuous lowering of river water levels, and hence lower ground water levels. Joint French-German studies demonstrated the need to build at least two further dams below Strasbourg to deal with the erosion problem. In the end, this was given formal shape in the German-French Treaty on the extension of the Rhine between Kehl/Strasbourg and Neuburgweier/Lauterburg (1969).

The construction of the two dams at Iffezheim and Gambsheim meant that the loop solutions for the canal and section canal had been given up entirely. Instead, the main water works - locks, power stations, cross-dams and weirs - were located in the Rhine river bed itself. In the treaty, France conceded its rights, as defined in the Treaty of Versailles, to the sole use of water power from the river, and the treaty partners agreed on joint disposition over this water resource and the electrical power it produces. Nearly identical dams were constructed at Gambsheim by the French Republic and at Iffezheim by the German Federal Republic with both power stations being run by joint German-French power station companies (the Centrale Electrique Rhénane de Gambsheim and the Rheinkraftwerk Iffezheim GmbH) as subsidiaries of the energy companies "Electricité de France" and "Energie Baden-Württemberg." The completion of the dam at Iffezheim in 1977 concluded the extension of the upper Rhine in this series of dam and reservoir measures.

Flood protection

Along with the beneficial effects of the Rhine extension for energy generation and shipping, there were also negative effects on downstream residents. In the course of building a series of dams and reservoirs to enlarge the upper Rhine, around 130 square kilometers of floodplains were cut off from the river in the area around these measures, meaning that around 60 percent of the natural retention areas between Basel and Iffezheim were lost. As a result, the flood wave flows faster and, when adversely combined with an overlap in wastewater flows from secondary sources, it can lead to considerable flood damage for those regions below the last dam site at Iffezheim. Flood levels at a 200-year record would cause an estimated DM 12.5 billion in economic damage.

For this reason, in 1982, France and Germany made a supplementary agreement to re-establish the flood protection measures below Iffezheim, which had existed prior to the extension of the upper reaches of the river. By the year 2015, a total volume of 212 million cubic meters shall be retained through a series of weirs and polders, together with specific actions on the part of the Rhine power stations. The costs shared by France and Germany total around DM 1.5 billion.

Franco-German institutional cooperation

In addition to reaching an agreement on the above-mentioned measures to improve conditions for navigation, power generation, and flood protection, it was also necessary to regulate institutional cooperation between the two countries.

With the effects of the First World War still in mind, bilateral cooperation between France and Germany was initially inconceivable. With the authority of the Versailles Treaty, France had already begun construction in the upper Rhine without taking into account - or having to take into account - any possible German interests. It was solely in the area of navigation that the German point of view could be included, through the multilateral CCNR, which had approval authority in matters relating to navigation on the river.

The Franco-German treaties of 1956 and 1969 saw, for the first time, bilateral commissions established, Committee A and a Permanent Committee, whose main tasks were to ensure the correct implementation of the terms of the agreements. These commissions consist of delegates and experts from both treaty partners. In passing resolutions, they are supported by working groups, which submit suggestions for resolutions on particular questions to their respective senior committee. The working groups too are comprised of members from both partner states.

The bilateral commissions take their decisions by mutual consent. It is characteristic of the cooperative spirit in these meetings that there has never been a need to make use of the arbitration clause provided in case of failure to reach agreement.

Summary

Although there have been three disastrous periods of open hostilities between the two nations over the last 150 years, which created and reinforced the notion of an 'arch enmity' between them, it has been possible since the Second World War for France and Germany to successfully develop relations based not only on cooperation and good neighborliness but also on friendship. In the cooperation achieved with regard to the Rhine, one can see the victory of political realism over national animosities. Whereas the Grand Canal d'Alsace, the first stage of river extension, was an explicit act of hostility against a neighbor, the subsequent loop solution already showed how the mood had changed from acting against one another to acting in concert. In the end, it became possible to reach a mutual solution for the last two dams.

While both committees have certainly experienced controversial discussions, despite this, the atmosphere at meetings has continually improved over the years, a tribute to the personal understanding which has developed between the committee members and continued mutual cooperation.